IMPROVING NATIONAL CAPACITY TO RESPOND TO COMPLEX EMERGENCIES

THE U.S. EXPERIENCE

DOUGLAS E. LUTE

FOREWORD BY
GENERAL GEORGE JOULWAN

APRIL 1998

A REPORT TO THE

CARNEGIE COMMISSION ON
PREVENTING DEADLY CONFLICT

CARNEGIE CORPORATION OF NEW YORK

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FOREWORD

THE COMPLEXITIES of the military engagements that face the United States today demand a serious discussion of strategy, operational planning, and decision making. For the U.S. military, post–Cold War strategy has been dominated by the "two major regional contingency" and "overwhelming force" planning assumptions—that is, that we will be able to fight two nearly simultaneous regional wars and that we will conduct these wars with enough firepower to overwhelm our opponents.

These assumptions have been useful for planning responses to some threats, but they are not sufficient for today's complex international environment. Indeed, while U.S. decision makers profess to be adapting to the new challenges we face, much of the foreign policy process remains wrapped in Cold War thinking and rhetoric. As we approach the twenty-first century, we need a fresh examination of the national security structure.

In this thought-provoking report, Colonel Douglas Lute argues that the decision-making apparatus in Washington is linked more to the

past than the future and that it needs an overhaul. In making his case, he examines recent deployments of U.S. forces in Bosnia, Haiti, and Somalia. In different ways, all three case studies point out major flaws in the organization and functioning of our national security apparatus. His analysis bears study, especially if we are to avoid a further widening of the inevitable gap between planners and implementers. The effects of this gap have been particularly evident for the United States. While the planning focus in Washington has been on the high end of the conflict spectrum—that is, on trying to imagine the strategic circumstances of potential war involving the United States—U.S. military forces have been decisively engaged in peace operations, humanitarian assistance, disaster relief, and other military operations at the lower end of the conflict spectrum. Our nation and our military will continue to confront—and need to address effectively—these missions.

Lute points out that our planning and implementation for crisis response remain unacceptably *ad hoc*. He argues that there is little or no institutionalized approach to formulate policy, develop consensus for multinational operations, or integrate civilian and military organizations in an overall effort. As one who was responsible for operations in Africa, Europe, and the Middle East, I can attest to the lack of a systematic process for developing policy for action in a crisis and providing resources. There is a belief in some departments in Washington that if you can do operations at the high end of the conflict spectrum, then you automatically can be successful at the lower end. Such misguided thinking could result in mission failure and risk unnecessary casualties. We do not need any more experiences like Somalia, where a major gap between policymaking and execution led to withdrawal of the U.S. contingent in 1994.

Colonel Lute sees an encouraging sign in the administration's recent establishment of an executive committee (EXCOMM) to oversee planning and to provide guidance for a comprehensive political–military plan. He offers three steps to follow:

- Institutionalize the EXCOMM process
- Prepare contingency plans that integrate civilian and military capabilities
- Engage others early in the crisis—including allies, NGOs, and international organizations

I agree with Colonel Lute, and would emphasize especially the importance of the first step—that is, the need to form a civilian–military team or task force immediately, when a crisis first appears, to prepare the integrated contingency plans, coordinate action, and monitor progress. There are many

allies and partners, as well as numerous agencies and nongovernmental organizations with a wide range of capabilities. We have yet to tap fully the expertise and resources available from all potential contributors. Colonel Lute's essay is an excellent beginning to a much-needed debate by those concerned with improving the way this nation responds to future crises — crises that, even as these words are written, are already looming on the horizon.

GENERAL GEORGE JOULWAN, U.S. ARMY (RET.)
Former Supreme Allied Commander, Europe

PREFACE

I

IMPROVING NATIONAL CAPACITY

TO RESPOND TO

COMPLEX EMERGENCIES

WHAT IS THE PROBLEM?

TODAY, SUCH CONCEPTS as failed states, intrastate conflict, and transnational threats have gained in importance even as old Cold War standbys like strategic deterrence, conventional stalemate, and superpower proxies fade away. Today's conflicts are different from their Cold War predecessors in several ways, including increased frequency and more civilian involvement. Moreover, much of the current violence occurs within states but attracts the attention of international actors. The largest of these internal conflicts cause destruction and dislocation on a scale far beyond the ability of any single state to handle.

     Over the last twenty years, the demand for humanitarian and other assistance to respond to internal conflict has risen dramatically.[1] Yet the capacity to manage these multilateral operations — especially at the strategic level — has not changed markedly since the days of the Cold War.[2] Operations can be viewed as having three levels: the strategic (or national and

international policy) level, the operational (or theater) level, and the tactical (or field) level. Coordination in response to complex emergencies tends to be most effective at the tactical level and least at the strategic level. At the strategic level, few national innovations are evident, and international mechanisms to coordinate the diverse array of services necessary to limit the effects of violence are too often the result of *ad hoc* arrangements and are prey to changing interests. At best, the resulting operations are inefficient; at worst, they exacerbate the situation.

This report evaluates the way the U.S. government coordinates its responses to post–Cold War complex emergencies.[3] Assuming that the United States will likely be involved to some extent in future response operations, the report argues that it must reform its bureaucratic procedures to address the new reality of intrastate conflicts.[4] Ultimately, such reform would be wide-ranging. But marginal improvements are possible now that could yield dramatic benefits in the way the U.S. government anticipates, plans for, and responds to complex emergencies. The aim is to improve national policy planning and implementation, which will increase U.S. policy coherence and effectiveness while avoiding the pitfalls that have come to typify these operations.

> Complex emergencies combine internal conflict with large-scale displacements of people, mass famine and fragile or failing economic, political and social institutions. Some complex emergencies are exacerbated by natural disasters and severely inadequate transport networks.
>
> *Global Humanitarian Emergencies*, 1995
> U.S. Mission to the UN, January 1995

This report begins at the root of the coordination problem: the tasks required on the ground and the actors who can perform these tasks. It highlights the complexity of these emergencies and points out the formidable challenges to effective coordination at the national policy level. Three cases— Somalia, Haiti, and Bosnia—will be used to examine how the U.S. government responded to unfolding events. The report concludes with specific recommendations for improving coordination within the U.S. government.

WHAT ARE THE TASKS?

The multiple causes of complex emergencies can be described as the entanglement of "four scourges": war, disease, hunger, and displacement.[5] The

fabric of society—including economic, political and social institutions—is frayed or torn. These conditions may result initially from natural or man-made causes, but their effects are often magnified by the politicization of the crisis. The crises often occur where conditions of scarcity predominate; the people struggle to subsist and have little economic opportunity. A mix of fighters and nonfighters usually exists, with migration between these categories common. Existing state governmental structures are often over-whelmed and exert little control over the situation, sometimes deliberately. Regional and global intergovernmental organizations and nongovern-mental actors may provide assistance, but sufficient help generally arrives late, after a deteriorating situation has gained momentum.[6]

These characteristics suggest the general tasks inherent in a re-sponse. In any specific case, the tasks will flow from the objectives of the response operation, which can range widely, from merely stopping the im-mediate large-scale loss of life to establishing democracy and a market economy. The importance of defining U.S. policy objectives for a response operation is addressed below (page 16). At this stage, we assume a response effort aimed at stopping a downward spiral, restoring stability, and pro-moting recovery.

The response tasks fall into five major categories: humanitarian, se-curity, political, social, and economic.[7] **Humanitarian** assistance aims to meet the basic subsistence needs of the population: food, water, shelter, and health care. Such assistance must be delivered to besieged cities or remote enclaves, often across difficult terrain, enduring tough weather and relying on staging areas near the crisis that often are nearly as remote and hostile. Human tragedy is usually the catalyst for external involvement in complex emergencies; these humanitarian tasks, therefore, are often the first to draw the attention of outside actors. By definition, however, the di-mensions of complex emergencies extend far beyond the demands of hu-manitarian aid.

Often accompanying the urgent need for humanitarian relief is the need for **security**. Security tasks vary widely. Important immediate tasks typ-ically include ensuring access and security for relief workers, monitoring ad-herence to agreements, and separating former warring parties. Longer-term security tasks can include demobilizing armed factions, supporting imple-mentation of arms control agreements, enforcing sanctions, and assisting demining programs. In addition, steps must be taken to restore all the ele-ments of a law and order system, including police, judiciary, and penal components.[8] Three variables play an important role in determining the nature of the security mission: the nature of the violence, the level of con-sent of the parties, and the proximity and interest of a dominant regional or global actor.[9]

Perhaps overlooked initially in the face of urgent demands for humanitarian relief and associated security, political, social, and economic tasks address some of the underlying causes of the emergency. Restoring a state in crisis to self-sufficiency, assuming such self-sufficiency ever existed, requires a long-term perspective and involves a range of tasks. More common and far more challenging—as the cases in this study indicate—is the case where there is little to restore. Building from scratch is much more complex than restoring. Setting the conditions for democratic government by encouraging free and fair elections, and building or strengthening governmental institutions—executive, legislative and judicial—are fundamental to developing a state's capacity to cope with its internal problems. Inherent in these tasks are many others, such as founding governmental legitimacy on a constitution accepted by the people, developing rules for all political parties, and promoting fair campaigning, including equal access to the media.[10]

Social engagement helps broaden the basis for self-sufficiency beyond the government to the roots of society and can include opening access to the media, resettling refugees, and reconciling opposed parties. Reconciliation itself is a broad task that could include resolving property disputes, setting up truth commissions, and supporting the prosecution of war criminals. Longer-term social tasks could involve supporting education and developing civic organizations that complement domestic political structures.[11]

Economic tasks, too, are extensive in scope and duration. Initially, reconstruction of vital infrastructure—public utilities, transportation networks, health facilities—will take priority in order to complement the humanitarian relief effort. Conducting broader reconstruction—especially providing housing, generating jobs, and promoting commerce and trade—are longer-term tasks. The development or restoration of institutions for finance, customs and taxes is, of course, also necessary to support governmental structures.

CHARACTERISTICS OF THE TASKS

From this overview of tasks, several characteristics emerge—tasks are multidimensional and interdependent; response operations are dynamic and require long-term perspective—that illustrate the complexity of coordinating national policy in response to a complex emergency. Policy coordination mechanisms must contend with these defining characteristics or risk being overwhelmed by the sheer complexity of the crisis.

RESPONSE TASKS ARE MULTIDIMENSIONAL AND INTERDEPENDENT

Response operations require a broad effort that draws upon a range of expertise. Such operations are expensive and demand multiple contributors. Further, the tasks are interdependent: they will be either mutually supporting or mutually defeating. For example, the provision of humanitarian assistance relies on sufficient security. Effective elections may depend on freedom of movement, access to the media, refugee resettlement, and a secure environment. In addition, tasks compete for resources from potential contributors; funds committed to one category are not available for another. The implication for policy is that these crises must be managed in the aggregate, as an integrated whole addressing all dimensions of the problem. The temptation to simplify policy by disaggregating the interrelated dimensions of the crisis will lead to inadequate coordination and ineffective response on the ground.

RESPONSE OPERATIONS ARE DYNAMIC

The "life cycle" of a response operation is analogous to treatment of a trauma patient: initial evaluation is followed by emergency life support and stabilization, leading to recovery in an intensive care unit, eventually followed by rehabilitation. As the operation moves from one phase to another—often, but not always, responding to changing circumstances on the ground—the relative priority of tasks can change. Initial emphasis on humanitarian assistance and security will shift as the situation improves to focus increasingly on political, economic and social tasks. Often, too, as tasks change, so will contributors performing those tasks. For example, those providing humanitarian assistance will pass off to others specializing in economic development, or those providing military security may gradually hand off to those reforming the police and justice system. Further, the phases of the operation will likely not be defined precisely; rather, transitions will occur awkwardly, with responsibilities either overlapping or overlooked. Rather than a clean, linear progression, "two steps forward and one step back" may be the pattern.[12] All these factors complicate response coordination at the national policy level. Governments must therefore take account of these factors and establish internal and external coordination mechanisms to provide continuity across the phases of the operation that are flexible enough to attain policy objectives even as the situation on the ground changes.

Humanitarian NGOs and the U.S. Military: Different Perspectives, Different Strengths

To illustrate these differences and the effects on crisis response, one might consider the sharp contrast between two prominent actors—the humanitarian NGO community and the U.S. military. While accepting the hazard of overgeneralization, it is possible to sketch the broad characteristics of this set of NGOs. Their core competency is to provide humanitarian aid, especially under emergency conditions. Most aim to be neutral in conflicts, impartial regarding the recipients of their aid, and independent of political interests. Many also strive to empower local authorities to provide for the needs of the affected population. These NGOs are engaged in problem regions for extended periods, often long before crises emerge as issues of international concern, and therefore they frequently have first-hand knowledge of the problems and an ability to respond quickly. They also often have a long-term view of the problem and remain engaged beyond the initial phases of the response operation. They are often decentralized and less burdened by bureaucracy than most governmental organizations, giving them a degree of operational flexibility. Their relief resources—including those received from nations, UN agencies, and intergovernmental organizations like the European Union—are usually substantial and can be tailored to the needs of particular complex emergencies. These attributes give NGOs several distinct comparative advantages over other potential contributors: the ability to sound the alarm on the face of impending crisis, to conduct initial needs assessments, and to provide relief and legitimacy in interacting with local officials.

NGOs may also suffer from several shortcomings. They often have coordination problems, both within individual NGOs and between groups of NGOs. They frequently compete for resources, opening the possibility that competition will impede cooperation. They are not homogeneous: many are specialized by function and geographical area. Few are large enough to take on multiple functions or to develop a full perspective on all aspects of the crisis. Their capacity for providing humanitarian assistance can be overwhelmed by very large, sustained, or simultaneous emergencies. Finally, NGOs do not provide security for their operations.

The U.S. military can expect to be deployed alongside NGOs, but with distinctly different institutional baggage; its objectives, capabilities and perspectives of the problem could hardly be more unlike those of NGOs. The military's core competency, of course, is war-fighting; humanitarian assistance missions are far from the organizational mainstream. The substantial capabilities the military could lend to complex emergencies—manpower, equipment, supplies—exist primarily to support its war-fighting missions and are designed to ensure self-sufficiency of combat forces in all possible environments. Since military capabilities committed in response to complex humanitarian emergencies are not available for combat missions, such response operations can detract from the military's combat readiness. Nonetheless, *A National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1996) and the *National Military Strategy of the United States 1997* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1997) include military operations other than war (MOOTW). The doctrine is well developed and training is conducted.

The organizational focus on combat operations is the basis for the U.S. military's perspective that its primary role in complex emergencies is to help ensure the effectiveness of other contributors and permit the rapid transition of responsibility to local authorities. Civilian and military leaders see this role as limited in both scope and duration. (See, for example, William Cohen's comments in Susanne M. Schafer, "Cohen Takes over at Pentagon, Cautions on Humanitarian Mission," Associated Press, January 24, 1997.) The military's organizational structure is hierarchical, stretching from field operators all the way back to political authorities in Washington. This chain of command both generates and relies on robust command and control mechanisms that emphasize unity of command, worldwide communications, well-trained staffs adept at planning, and standard procedures that are codified in written doctrine.

The U.S. military has considerable advantages over other contributing organizations in complex crisis scenarios. It can arrive on the scene of a crisis within hours with key logistics capabilities needed early in a complex crisis: large stockpiles of supplies, the ability to transport masses of cargo worldwide, and a well-rehearsed organizational structure linking the two. The U.S. military's command and control mechanisms can coordinate diverse tasks, especially at regional and local levels. When the military deploys, it comes as a robust, self-sufficient package, able to operate in the most austere conditions and support other organizations such as NGOs.

These advantages are constrained, however, by the military's view that relief operations detract from its central mission of war fighting. In practical terms this means that the U.S. military plans for relief operations that will be limited in scope and duration. Reinforcing this view is the challenge faced by political authorities to generate congressional and public support for military deployments that are seen as not vital to U.S. national security. Further, if the U.S. military were to remain engaged for an extended period, the risk increases that unrealistic expectations and even dependency could develop within the crisis country and among the other contributors. The military's tendency to take charge increases this risk.

The net effect of these factors is that the U.S. military may be among the first to arrive and among the first to depart, creating early transition challenges among the varied contributors on the ground.

Yet despite the sharp organizational contrasts between NGOs and the U.S. military, they have managed to cooperate to a significant degree, especially in the field. Division of labor based on comparative advantage has been practiced; for example, in 1994, NGOs in Rwanda focused on "retail" aid distribution while the U.S. military performed "wholesale" logistics functions. Civil–military operations centers (CMOCs) were born of necessity in Northern Iraq and Somalia and are now considered standard operating procedure to integrate the civilian and military dimensions of an operation. Both NGO documents (for example, the Oslo Declaration and Plan of Action, especially pages 24–25[51]) and U.S. military doctrinal manuals (see, for example, Field Manual No. 100–23, especially pp. 26–28, and Joint Publication 3-08, pp. II-18 to II-20, both cited in note 2, above) reflect appreciation of the other actors and address the need for mutual cooperation. The Army's Joint Readiness Training Center routinely conducts training exercises that involve NGOs. After-action reviews for recent operations are attended by both parties. This level of cooperation, however, is not apparent at the national policy level.

RESPONSE OPERATIONS REQUIRE A LONG-TERM VIEW

Complex humanitarian emergencies demand a comprehensive response extending well beyond initial humanitarian aid. All the categories of tasks mentioned above, but particularly the political, social, and economic tasks, require extended recovery and rehabilitation efforts measured in years or even generations rather than months. The longer the duration of the required response, the greater the need for effective coordination to ensure that sufficient resources are committed throughout the life cycle of the operation. The policy implication is that coordination must be sustained over the entire life cycle of the response, and it must be structured from the outset to achieve an enduring effect even as responsibility passes from external actors to local authorities.

WHO ARE THE ACTORS?

In any complex emergency, the specific situation will influence the nature of the tasks required, their relative importance, and interrelationship. What is clear at this point is that a comprehensive response operation is probably beyond the capabilities of any single actor—including the United States. The staggering scope and complexity of the tasks involved in responding to complex emergencies demand the coordinated action of a wide array of contributors. The international cast of potential actors is large and diverse, including the state where the emergency occurs, other states, global and regional international organizations, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), business, the media, and the people and leaders affected by the crisis. Within the U.S. government alone, the number and diversity of potential actors involved is nearly as great, including the National Security Council staff; the Departments of State, Defense, Commerce, and Justice (often each with numerous subordinate agencies and offices); and the Congress. The experiences of the past half dozen years have resulted in new relationships among many of these actors, but these relationships are largely informal and exist below the national policy level. By any measure, the potential contributors—both in the international arena and within the U.S. government—remain a loose, unintegrated set of actors, who, not surprisingly, hold fast to different perspectives, goals, capabilities, structures and cultures.[13]

       This overview of international and U.S. actors illustrates a fundamental challenge of coordinating an effective response: transforming an unintegrated network of diverse potential contributors into an effective team that draws on comparative advantages and accommodates the limi-

tations of individual actors. The actors will likely not agree entirely on what is required. Their objectives will differ. Some will focus on the short term, others on the long term. They will focus on different dimensions of the operation; few will take a comprehensive view. In some cases, operational procedures may conflict: for example, the military may focus on operational security (maintaining confidentiality to enhance force protection), while others share information more willingly. And again, engagement often changes over the life cycle of the response operation as a result of competing priorities, exhaustion, overextension, renewed violence or other changes in the situation, or other demands elsewhere, further complicating the coordination challenge.

The importance of effective coordination of potential contributors—those within the U.S. government and international actors as well—extends well beyond the fundamental requirement to match contributors with tasks over time. A partnership of contributors offers important advantages. The burden of hugely expensive operations can be shared among the partners, increasing support for long-term contributions. The overall efficiency of the response effort can be optimized by drawing on comparative advantages of various actors and avoiding duplication of effort. A wide cast of international contributors can enhance the legitimacy of the response, guarding against perceptions that any single actor is gaining too much influence in the sovereign affairs of the host state. The net effect of coordinating a team of actors is a coherent multilateral response that is both effective and enduring.

2.

ACCEPTING THE CHALLENGE: GAPS, SEAMS, AND MYOPIA

THIS ASSESSMENT of tasks and actors points to the essence of the coordination challenge at the national policy level: bringing coherence to the actions of a large number of diverse contributors in a multidimensional, dynamic situation. More specifically, the assessment illustrates three "policy coordination pitfalls"—gaps, seams, and myopia—that must be avoided if the response is to be effective. Even if the objectives of the U.S. response operation are limited to initial humanitarian relief and associated security, coordination will be complicated, and these pitfalls must be taken into account.

GAPS

"Gaps" occur when an essential task in a multilateral response to a complex crisis is not accomplished for one or more of the following reasons: the

requirement is not recognized, no actor has the capability to perform the task required, no actor accepts responsibility for the task, the responsibility for the task is not clearly assigned among several competing actors, or a policy decision is made not to do the task.[14] Tasks are interdependent, so a gap adversely affects other dimensions of the operation and inhibits overall progress.

A prominent gap that has plagued several recent operations is the public security or police gap.[15] Currently, the capacity of international actors to address effectively the need for local law and order during complex emergencies is quite low. Local police are frequently part of the crisis, and thus not readily part of the solution. While international military forces can provide a generally secure environment by protecting against larger-scale military conflict, they are not optimally organized, trained, or equipped to perform civil police functions. A gap, then, develops—as in Bosnia today—between the need for local security from crime and civil unrest and the broad security provided by military forces. In Bosnia, the attempt to fill this gap with the International Police Task Force has met with little success, inhibiting progress in several other dimensions of the operation, including freedom of movement and return of refugees.[16] Other gaps that have appeared in the Bosnia operation include apprehension of indicted war criminals and promotion of access to the media.

Apprehending War Criminals: A Gap in Bosnia

I think a way must be found where a police force can be constituted that would take care of those instances where the signatories to the (Dayton) agreement continue to refuse to turn over those war criminals.

> General John Shalikashvili, quoted in the *Washington Post*
> December 18, 1996, page A25.

We ought to consider whether there should be a permanent international war crimes tribunal, which of course would require some sort of way of carrying out its mandate.

> President Clinton, addressing the question of how to
> apprehend indicted war criminals in Bosnia, quoted in
> the *Washington Post*, January 30, 1997, page A8.

SEAMS

A "seam" reflects an ineffective transition from one phase of an operation to the next. Here the policy challenge is to ensure smooth, effective adjust-

ments as priorities, tasks, actors and responsibilities change over the operation's life cycle. Handoffs between actors are common, especially after the crisis response phase, as actors with comparative advantages in rapid response pass responsibility to others. In Somalia, seams developed as the operation moved from the simultaneous UNOSOM and UNITAF to UNOSOM II. In contrast, the operation in Haiti featured relatively seamless transitions between the Multi-national Force (MNF), the United Nations Mission in Haiti (UNMIH), and successor operations.[17]

U.S.–UN Transition in Somalia: A Seam

Why expect a seamless transition to UN-led peacekeeping to flow from a rancorous argument between Washington and UN Headquarters about whether the transfer should even take place and whether the United States had completed its initial task?

Chester A. Crocker
"The Lessons of Somalia: Not Everything Went Wrong,"
Foreign Affairs 74 (3), May/June 1995, pp. 4–5.

MYOPIA

"Myopia"—shortsightedness—is the tendency to focus on the initial crisis response and then pay insufficient attention to the long-term requirements. The prominence of such impatience or short attention span in relief operations has several roots, including limited resources for response operations, donor fatigue, failure to sustain public support for long-term international efforts, and poor planning. Myopia often contributes to the problems of gaps and seams. For example, in Somalia the initial international effort focused narrowly on providing humanitarian assistance, and this led to problems later as the effort coped ineffectively with the political, economic, and social roots of the crisis, which demanded a broader perspective, additional capabilities, and transitions among contributors. Again, effective responses to complex emergencies require a long-term perspective, contributing to continuity throughout the life cycle of the operation. This is not to suggest that the United States or any other contributor must assume full responsibility for the long-term success of a response effort; for example, U.S. objectives may range from limited humanitarian relief early in an international operation to complete nation building. Rather, contributors—regardless of their objectives—should be aware that addressing the underlying causes of these crises requires long-term efforts.

If myopia exists at the national policy level, the prospects for effective response are largely confined to the emergency stage, leaving the underlying causes of the crisis unaddressed and setting the stage for recurrences. In the United States, sustained involvement hinges on ensuring public (and congressional) support, a difficult challenge when these expensive response operations are viewed as only marginally relevant to national interests.[18] The need to generate and sustain public support points to the importance of achieving early and repeated success in a response operation. Success breeds momentum, a perception of legitimacy, and support for continuing, while failure suggests these operations are futile and not among vital national interests.

Acknowledging Myopia: U.S. Troops Remain in Bosnia

The progress is unmistakable. But it is not yet irreversible. Bosnia has been at peace only half as long as it was at war. It remains poised on a tightrope, moving toward a better future, but not at the point yet of a self-sustaining peace. To get there, the people of Bosnia still need a safety net and a helping hand. . . .

I did think that in 18 months — I honestly believed in 18 months we could get this done at the time I said it. And it wasn't — I wasn't — right, which is why I don't want to make that error again. . . .

I do think we should stay there until we believe we've got the job done. . . .

President Clinton, announcing that U.S. troops would remain in Bosnia beyond the planned withdrawal date of June 1998. Press conference, Washington, D.C., December 18, 1997.

3

MEETING THE COORDINATION CHALLENGE: THREE CASE STUDIES

IN LIGHT OF SUCH CHALLENGES, how can greater coherence and unity of effort be achieved in responses to complex emergencies? Perhaps not surprisingly, the experience of the last several years has yielded a number of operational innovations, such as civil–military operations centers and multi-agency training exercises (both U.S. and other). But progress at the field and operational levels has not been matched at the strategic level. Governments, particularly the U.S. government, continue to respond in an *ad hoc* manner when confronting complex emergencies. Given that U.S. policy objectives and the degree of U.S. involvement may vary widely from case to case, what are the specific requirements for more effective coordination at the national level?

REQUIREMENTS FOR EFFECTIVE RESPONSE

In general terms, there are four requirements for a more effective U.S. policy response to complex emergencies[19]:

- Leadership
- A comprehensive plan
- Adequate resources
- A mechanism to monitor implementation

LEADERSHIP

Strategic leadership is key to an effective international response. This is not, however, a call for U.S. leadership of every international response to complex emergencies. Some other states, the UN, and regional organizations are all capable of leading a multilateral international effort. Nonetheless, even if the United States does not assume responsibility as lead state, it will likely play a prominent role in most large-scale engagements in which it participates. In Haiti, for example and perhaps not surprisingly, the United States dominated: it led the initial military intervention, crafted the follow-on UN mission, and was the single largest contributor to the overall operation. In Bosnia, on the other hand, the United States did not take the clear lead until 1995, when it spearheaded the diplomatic effort that resulted in the Dayton Peace Agreement, although it remained influential through its roles in the UN Security Council, NATO, and the five-nation Contact Group.[20] It is no less important to establish leadership *within* the U.S. government. An internal U.S. leadership structure— designating someone to be in charge—is vital whether the United States is leading the international effort or is one among other nations.[21] In either case, the experiences of Somalia, Haiti, and Bosnia illustrate that the way the U.S. configures itself to formulate policy will either promote or thwart the overall international response.

A PLAN

A comprehensive U.S. government plan is at the center of a coordinated response. It is the glue that binds the multiple requirements with the diverse contributors across the life cycle of the response effort. A timely, well-conceived United States plan can serve as the catalyst for similar planning by other key international contributors. It is the primary means to avoid the policy pitfalls described above.

The plan begins with a full assessment of the specific needs of the crisis. Establishing clear, realistic objectives for initial and follow-on phases is paramount. Objectives must be based on a sober assessment of the indigenous situation, the response tasks required, and the level of effort that can be generated and sustained.[22] Getting the objectives right is the single most important part of the plan. A strategic concept for attaining the objectives links means to ends and includes milestones and plans for transitions between phases. The plan also assigns tasks to actors based on comparative advantage, thereby setting responsibilities and establishing accountability. Finally, the plan must be flexible enough to allow for the unexpected by developing multiple paths to the objectives.

A sophisticated policy planning regime develops contingency plans based on hypothetical complex emergencies, thus moving beyond planning only in the face of an imminent crisis. Such plans would highlight potential policy coordination problems and thus contribute to improving the responsiveness of national efforts once a crisis occurs.[23]

ADEQUATE RESOURCES

Assembling adequate resources to implement the plan poses special coordination challenges. Fitting actors—both U.S. and international—to tasks and forging a partnership focused on a common objective will help close gaps, smooth seams, and resist myopia. A key preliminary step is to develop a comprehensive database of potential contributors and their comparative advantages by function and geographic region; initial efforts to accomplish this task have not yet produced adequate results.[24] The requirement to assemble resources throughout the response operation is among the most important roles of the U.S. leadership structure.[25] Further, since resources are expensive and require political commitment, this may also be the most difficult role for the bureaucratic leader within the U.S. government.

A MECHANISM TO MONITOR IMPLEMENTATION

A mechanism to monitor responsibilities and milestones during implementation is essential. The aim is to establish accountability for action. Codifying a national policy decision into a plan does not ensure compliance by agencies of the U.S. government, much less external contributors. Congress must be convinced to support the policy with resources and to allow sufficient freedom of action for the plan to be implemented. While the plan is the starting point for implementation, the coordination challenge includes adapting the plan as required by the situation on the ground.

Unforeseen circumstances may require adjustments in the plan to sustain the relationship of means to ends (that is, of tasks to actors to objectives). For example, as the situation develops, the role of the recipient state, one of the most important actors, must be continually strengthened to promote transition to a "local cure" and return to normalcy. Such adjustments require continuous monitoring and follow-up once the operation is under way.

The three cases discussed in the next sections illustrate how the United States has adapted thus far to the challenge of coordinating complex emergencies. The report concludes with some modest recommendations for next steps within the U.S. government.

SOMALIA: A FIRST ATTEMPT[26]

On December 9, 1992, U.S. Marines seized the port and airfield in Mogadishu as the first wave of forces in the Unified Task Force (UNITAF) arrived in Somalia. Their mandate was to ensure delivery of relief supplies as a complement to the UN's ongoing humanitarian relief effort that had begun in April but that had proved insufficient. Somalia was in chaos: anarchy, violence, and starvation combined to create one of the first complex emergencies of the post–Cold War era. Sixteen months later, U.S. forces completed their withdrawal from Somalia and from the UN Operation in Somalia II (UNOSOM II). These two milestones mark one of the first attempts by the U.S. to participate as a principal actor in response to such an international emergency. UN operations continued for another year, but with little effect on overall results. Famine was largely defeated, but chaos persisted in Somalia. Thirty American troops and 106 more from other national contingents were killed, and UN credibility suffered a severe blow. In the years ahead, Somalia would serve as the formative case for U.S. policy toward such crises.

The UN's operation in Somalia, largely shaped by the United States, was a shaky start to the unfolding pattern of international responses to complex emergencies in the 1990s. An experienced observer summarized the Somalia operation:

> . . . the United Nations was on a binge of humanitarian relief and military foolhardiness, a roller coaster of complex and confused multilateral, unilateral and quasi-lateral activity, attempting to integrate security, political and economic strategies, suffering the consequences of herky-jerky behavior of the international community, and saving an estimated quarter million lives through its humanitarian relief efforts.[27]

While the UN led the international response in Somalia, the United States was the single most important outside party, playing a prominent role in UN Security Council deliberations and on the ground. The effect was that policy in the UN and operational matters in Somalia were largely driven by Washington.

In Washington, the policymaking process was flawed from the outset and remained that way throughout U.S. involvement. Even though Somalia moved to the top of the foreign policy agenda, with the deployment of 28,000 U.S. troops, no clear bureaucratic leader emerged, no strategic plan existed, insufficient resources were marshaled, and no effective follow-up mechanism was established.

LEADERSHIP

The absence of leadership within the U.S. government hampered both policymaking and policy implementation. At the outset, in early 1992, the "interagency" process addressed the growing crisis as a purely humanitarian issue.[28] The result of this narrow definition of the problem was policy focused on only one dimension that drew nearly exclusively on USAID and the humanitarian bureaus of the state and defense departments that are concerned with relief. No overall policy leader—such a leader would most naturally have come from the State Department—was established, and the process meandered in search of consensus. As the crisis worsened in the fall of 1992, President Bush twice took the lead and broke the U.S. policy log-jam.[29] First, in August, he announced a significant increase in U.S. relief aid. Then, in November, he decided to deploy a strong U.S. military force to lead UNITAF and provide security to the relief effort. By this time, Somalia was in full crisis, and U.S. policy was being run from the White House, with the Deputies Committee of the National Security Council (NSC) meeting regularly to develop options for the president.[30]

As U.S. troops deployed as part of UNITAF, an interagency task force was set up by the Department of State to coordinate U.S. policy. This task force, however, was too weak and recently formed to withstand the loss of continuity during the Bush–Clinton transition. For its part, the new administration—like its predecessor—did not assign an agency leader for Somalia policy, in part because it was new and in part because it was distracted by other policy crises in Iraq and the former Yugoslavia. The administration's first ten months saw the success of UNITAF become overwhelmed by the hasty and inept transition to UNOSOM II, the new expansive nation-building mission mandated by the UN Security Council, and the disastrous hunt for Aideed.

Within a week of the tragic raid on October 3, 1993, a policy review was launched in Washington and a new interagency structure was established to formulate and implement U.S. policy toward Somalia.[31] An Executive Committee (EXCOMM) of the NSC was formed, cochaired by the NSC staff and the Somalia Coordinator of the State Department. Thereafter, senior representatives from the interagency met regularly and reported to the Deputies Committee. The EXCOMM took a number of steps toward policy coordination, such as paying increased attention to the police gap and conditioning further U.S. aid on cooperation of Somali factions, but its primary focus was on developing a plan to bring to a close the U.S. military involvement—a goal that was achieved on March 25, 1994.

The formation and operation of the EXCOMM can be summarized as too little, too late. Only when the crisis became overwhelming did Somalia receive the attention it deserved, and only then did the interagency organize itself to handle the crisis in a comprehensive way. By then, however, the political cost of continuing in the crisis was too high. Yet the Somalia EXCOMM featured strong personalities as leaders, access to decision makers, and broad interagency representation. While it was formed too late to make a significant difference in the outcome in Somalia, the EXCOMM did represent a model for future handling of complex emergencies.

A PLAN

The U.S. government produced no comprehensive strategic plan for its response to the Somalia emergency. This failure in Washington reverberated widely and contributed to the lack of integration among the various dimensions—humanitarian, security, political—of the international response. In the absence of an integrated plan, U.S. policy and hence the international response developed sequentially, focusing first on one dimension and then on another while largely neglecting others altogether. Initially, U.S. policy was almost entirely humanitarian; then the focus shifted to security as U.S. troops were deployed. Never taken adequately into account were the political, economic, and social aspects of the problem. Moreover, U.S. strategic objectives were not spelled out, a fact that contributed to lack of clarity and incremental shifts over time.

One analyst reflects:

> It seems self-evident that conditions conducive to the desired political settlement might have followed the establishment of the secure environment needed for humanitarian activities. That they did not is no indication of failure on the part of the forces sent to Somalia to ensure that humanitarian aid could be distributed to the starving citizens and refugees in that country.

Those forces did what they were asked to do. What was missing was a strategic vision for Somalia, one that could have integrated political goals with the missions assigned to the military. The failure of the United Nations to foster from the outset such an integrated strategy for Somalia may have reversed the gains made by the military in at least part of the country.[32]

In a review of its experience in Somalia, the UN recognized the need for "a coherent vision, strategy and plan of action which integrate all the relevant dimensions of the problem, including humanitarian, political and security."[33] That the United States—the single most influential state involved—produced no such plan for its own policy undoubtedly contributed to the overall strategic problems in Somalia. In particular, a comprehensive U.S. plan could have illuminated the fallacy of focusing too much on the military dimension, pointed to the problem of moving from UNITAF to UNOSOM II when the United States and the UN disagreed on handoff conditions, and highlighted the challenge of supporting the UN's first-ever peace enforcement effort.

ADEQUATE RESOURCES

A persistent gap between ends—in so far as any were defined clearly—and means existed throughout the Somalia operation. This gap is partly attributable to setting unrealistic goals, but it also resulted from the simple fact that the United States was unwilling to assemble the resources necessary to restore Somalia to any semblance of normalcy. But the problem was actually much worse than a mere unwillingness to provide adequate resources for plans. In fact, the United States continually supported broader mandates—like that for UNOSOM II—while consistently failing to generate corresponding resources. In addition, Washington focused on military tools at the expense of other means, especially those needed for political, economic, and police requirements.

A MECHANISM TO MONITOR IMPLEMENTATION

Within the U.S. government, absence of leadership and a strategic plan led to *ad hoc* policy formulated in reaction to the latest crisis on the ground. In this situation, there could be no effective follow-up, and in fact there was none.

If the EXCOMM had been placed in charge of monitoring implementation of an integrated plan, U.S. policy might have looked quite different. For example, the focus on military means might have been put

in a broader perspective of U.S. policy to address the underlying sources of Somalia's crisis. Without a leader or a plan, however, assessment of a follow-up mechanism is meaningless.

SUMMARY

The U.S. government's response to the crisis in Somalia was one of its first post–Cold War attempts to cope with a complex emergency. Acting largely through the UN, the United States contributed significantly to both the successes and failures of the international effort. Despite the undeniable humanitarian accomplishments, the Somalia experience is perceived as overwhelmingly negative. The operation will be remembered for the staggering complexity of the problems, the tragic loss of U.S. and other UN troops, and the substantial loss of UN credibility in leading an international response. No less memorable, however, is the lingering dissatisfaction with a U.S. policy that lacked leadership, had no comprehensive plan, focused too much on military resources, and failed to anticipate or develop a follow-on strategy to cope with longer-term issues.

HAITI: ONE STEP FORWARD[34]

In the aftermath of Somalia, the Clinton administration developed a policy on how to handle such operations. Presidential Decision Directive 25 (PDD-25), "Policy on Reforming Multilateral Peace Operations," emerged in May 1994 and set out the general conditions for U.S. participation in peace operations and described how such operations would be managed in Washington. For example, PDD-25 states that when U.S. combat troops are committed, the Department of Defense will take the interagency lead, and when they are not, the State Department will lead.

By the time PDD-25 was signed, the U.S. was confronting its next complex emergency, one that featured both distinct differences from Somalia and remarkable similarities. Unlike Somalia, Haiti was close to the U.S. and developments in 1993–94 affected the United States' direct interests. Further, the crisis in Haiti was not of the same scale as in Somalia: there was no civil war, tens of thousands were not dying, and a central government did exist. Nonetheless, the crisis in Haiti still had the dimensions of a complex emergency.

Haiti is broadly viewed in U.S. policy circles as a success story; this is certainly true if the yardstick is Somalia, but not in absolute terms. The

military intervention stabilized the situation and quickly led to the restoration of the duly elected Aristide government. Repressive military and police structures were replaced and democratic government systems given a chance to develop. While poverty still plagues Haiti and criminal—perhaps political—violence remains a problem, there is no question that Haiti is better off today than in September 1994 when the U.S.-led multinational force landed. How did the United States respond to this somewhat scaled-down complex emergency in its own backyard to produce such (relatively) positive results?

LEADERSHIP

In late spring 1994, as conditions in Haiti deteriorated and a political solution seemed unlikely, the U.S. government established an EXCOMM to handle the crisis.[35] This body provided the interagency leadership throughout the planning and implementation phases of the operation. The Haiti EXCOMM included officials from State, Defense, Justice, Treasury, the CIA, and USAID and was chaired by two interagency veterans of the Somalia experience. On occasion, the EXCOMM broadened its cast by including operational-level military commanders, UN officials, and NGO representatives. The two principal players—State and Defense—also established internal task forces to cope with day-to-day matters and respond to the EXCOMM. The EXCOMM, however, was the authoritative leader of the interagency policymaking process.

The Haiti EXCOMM was not a panacea. For example, even with this leadership arrangement in place in May, some guidance from Washington to operational-level planners was delayed until August, just one month before the military intervention.[36] Nonetheless, the effectiveness of the EXCOMM as the interagency leader contributed significantly to the coherence of U.S. policy in response to the crisis in Haiti.

A PLAN

The most important product of the EXCOMM was a comprehensive political-military plan—the first of its kind for a complex emergency. Planning began in late spring 1994 independently within the Department of Defense and USAID. The EXCOMM plan brought these efforts together and integrated other key actors as well, such as the Justice Department's International Criminal Investigative Training Assistance Program (ICITAP), NGOs, and the UN's Mission in Haiti (UNMIH). The result was a comprehensive road map for U.S. policy that was approved by the Deputies Com-

mittee of the NSC. The Haiti plan established clear policy objectives, assigned responsibilities within the interagency, set milestones for implementation, and focused on transition of the initial U.S.-led intervention to the UN's follow-on mission.

The Haiti plan proved flexible as the situation on the ground changed. The U.S. military adapted its operation from invasion to unopposed entry when the Haitian military regime agreed to depart peacefully within hours of the beginning of the planned invasion. Later, adjustments were made when the Haitian public security system suddenly disintegrated, threatening a serious public security gap. Throughout the operation, draft resolutions for the UN Security Council were crafted to sustain the coherence set out in the EXCOMM's plan. Most impressive is the fact that the Haiti plan—now in its third version—is still in use today, nearly three years after it began to bring together the disparate elements of U.S. policy.

Building a comprehensive plan went a long way toward avoiding the pitfalls typical of these operations. Potential gaps in such areas as reforming Haitian police, controlling weapons, and supporting elections were anticipated. The plan helped to prevent seams during the U.S.-to-UN transition by addressing the details of the handoff early and by including UN officials. The plan took a long-term perspective—avoiding myopia—by addressing the underlying roots of the Haiti crisis.

The plan had an important secondary effect: it served as a catalyst for further detailed coordination to manage key junctures of the operation. For example, just one week before the military landed in Haiti, an interagency "rehearsal" was held in Washington to fine-tune the coordination called for in the plan. This event highlighted numerous misunderstandings and the need for further coordination. Later that fall, the plan served as the basis for an all-day conference in Washington with UN officials to coordinate the U.S.–UN handoff, an important step in assuring a smooth transition.

Despite the well-developed strategic plan, interagency problems occurred, in part because some aspects of the plan were not implemented and some commitments not fulfilled.[37] Other problems arose at the operational level, and late or inadequate policy guidance may have contributed. Without doubt, however, the plan for Haiti was a vast improvement over the Somalia experience.

ADEQUATE RESOURCES

Adequate resources—both U.S. and international—were marshaled to address the wide scope of problems in Haiti. In keeping with the basic con-

cept for the operation, the U.S. accepted responsibility for providing re-
sources for the initial operation, then passed responsibility to the UN while
remaining the dominant actor. For example, in the 28-nation, 21,000-
soldier multinational force that initiated the operation, the United States
provided all but about 2,000 of the troops and all the support. Once the
UN took over, the United States provided 2,400 of the 6,000 troops.
Further, the United States demonstrated its commitment to the operation
by taking the lead in recruiting international contributors of troops and
police and donors of humanitarian aid and development funds. The
United States trained and supplied troop contingents for the multinational
force and later provided the force commander and a number of key staff
officers for the UN force. The United States sponsored an innovative
training session for the UNMIH military and civilian staff just before they
took over the mission in Haiti—an initiative that greatly facilitated the
transition.[38]

Aside from the military effort, the United States marshaled re-
sources for the justice system, public works, schools, economic assistance,
infrastructure repair, the legislative system, and elections. For example, the
major U.S.-led effort to reform the Haitian police, and thus to avoid a
public security gap, included recruiting, training, and managing the 900
international police monitors (IPM) authorized by the UN mandate. These
IPMs were to oversee Haiti's "interim public security force" while ICITAP ran
a police academy to develop the Haitian National Police. Although it has
attained only limited success thus far, this reform effort continues today,
largely funded by the United States.

A MECHANISM TO MONITOR IMPLEMENTATION

From the outset, the plan for Haiti included two essential follow-up fea-
tures: handoffs first to UNMIH and ultimately to elected Haitian authori-
ties; and retaining the EXCOMM to monitor U.S. implementation of the
plan. These mechanisms have been largely successful.

In particular, the transition from the U.S.-led multinational force
to UNMIH was seamless, smooth and efficient, a sharp contrast to the trou-
bled handoff in Somalia from UNITAF to UNOSOM II. The key to the suc-
cessful transition in Haiti is that the hand-off was integral to the original
concept and imbedded in the strategic plan. All participants recognized
where the operation was intended to head and could direct their efforts
toward that common goal. Among the early steps taken to promote a
smooth transition was the 60-person UNMIH advance team that began to
arrive in Haiti only a week after the multinational force to prepare for the

deployment of the UN force six months later. Similar coordination took place at the strategic level as EXCOMM members maintained frequent contact with their UN counterparts. The gradual transition to Haitian authorities continues as UNMIH has been replaced by three successive UN missions, each smaller than its predecessor.[39]

In Washington, the EXCOMM shifted its focus from planning to implementation. The strategic plan was revised as needed to keep up with the situation on the ground. Resources were adjusted to address needs. Milestones and measures of effectiveness were tracked and responsible agencies held accountable for progress. Successful implementation in Haiti was founded on the EXCOMM's strong leadership and the integrated plan.

SUMMARY

Despite these vast improvements over the Somalia experience, problems arose in Haiti during implementation. For example, promoting economic development, sustaining progress in public security, reforming the justice system, and bolstering the fragile democratic process have proven difficult.[40] These persistent problems call for continued international engagement while the United States and other contributors patiently require Haitian authorities to assume full responsibility. The continuing problems also underscore the enormous effort involved in responding to complex emergencies: effective governmental structures cannot be built quickly, especially where there are no democratic traditions upon which to build. Even in light of these problems, however, the improvement within the U.S. government in responding to Haiti, compared with Somalia, was dramatic. The interagency demonstrated that it could organize itself at the strategic level to contribute to a successful response operation. While UNMIH was still deployed and before the U.S. government could absorb the lessons of Haiti, however, the United States faced the need to participate in the response to another complex emergency: Bosnia.

BOSNIA: TWO STEPS BACK[41]

As Yugoslavia disintegrated in 1991, the aftermath of the Gulf War and the breakup of the former Soviet Union preoccupied the United States. Somalia and Haiti had not yet drawn the world's attention. While playing a key diplomatic role from the outset, the United States was not engaged in any substantial operational way as its European allies deployed troops

to support the UN-led effort to respond to the unfolding war in the former Yugoslavia. From the beginning and for the next four years, the UN's response suffered from a mismatch between mandate and resources.

By the summer of 1995 this situation shifted dramatically, as the United States assumed leadership in defining a solution for the crisis in Bosnia. Numerous factors combined to produce a cease-fire in October 1995, the Dayton Peace Agreement in November, and the commitment of about 60,000 NATO troops, including some 20,000 U.S. troops, to Bosnia in December. Today a smaller NATO force, still including U.S. troops, remains in Bosnia as the military arm of the international effort to implement the peace accord.

Substantial success in the military tasks, however, has not been matched in the other dimensions of implementation, leading to dismal long-term forecasts for Bosnia. In March 1997—nearly a year and a half after Dayton—during a visit to Washington, Bosnian president Izetbegovic stated: "If the international community under strong U.S. leadership does not undertake immediate and resolute action, the Dayton Accords will be remembered in history as a very expensive cease-fire."[42]

LEADERSHIP

As the United States asserted itself as the leader of the international response to the crisis in Bosnia in the summer of 1995, a bureaucratic leader within the U.S. interagency emerged as well. Assistant Secretary of State Richard Holbrooke took charge of Bosnia policy. His diplomatic team— including representatives from the NSC and the Department of Defense— conducted shuttle diplomacy from August through October 1995, orchestrated the talks in Dayton, and launched immediate tasks leading to the commitment of NATO's Implementation Force (IFOR) in late December. Holbrooke's unmistakable leadership within the interagency during this period had several shortcomings. First, Holbrooke was necessarily focused on the near-term requirements of attaining a cease-fire backed up by a comprehensive peace agreement, but this focus constrained the interagency planning for the longer term. The myopic focus on attaining a peace agreement meant that little attention was given to implementing one. Second, the demands of his peace mission kept Holbrooke and his team out of Washington. In their absence, and given the fluid nature of the ongoing negotiations with multiple parties, the interagency became passive, awaiting reports from the team.

When Holbrooke left the government in early 1996, leadership within the interagency on Bosnia was never effectively re-established. In

addition to those with responsibility for Bosnia at State and on the NSC staff, a succession of Department of State officials held the position of special coordinator for Bosnia, but for a variety of reasons none really directed the U.S. effort. In 1995, just before U.S. troops were deployed as part of IFOR, a Bosnia EXCOMM was established, jointly chaired by NSC and State. This organ, however, remains immersed in day-to-day issues and has not addressed the deeper issues of U.S. policy. This lack of leadership has produced a U.S. policy that remains internally inconsistent and focuses too much on the military dimension of the response effort.[43]

A PLAN

Today there is no comprehensive political–military plan for the U.S. effort in Bosnia. The Dayton Peace Accords are the starting point for any plan to integrate the dimensions of the international response effort, but it alone is insufficient to synchronize U.S. policy.[44] An attempt was made between the Dayton negotiations and the deployment of IFOR to construct such a plan, but it remains incomplete.

The international response—led by the United States since the summer of 1995—predictably reflects the lack of integrated planning within the U.S. government. There is no plan that brings together the responsibilities assigned in the Dayton accords to diverse actors. The array of contributors in Bosnia is quite broad, reflecting the size and complexity of the task, and includes the Bosnian parties and neighboring states, NATO, the Office of the High Representative (which is responsible for coordinating civilian implementation tasks), the UN, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), and the World Bank. This varied cast increases the importance of an integrating plan, yet none exists. As an exception, NATO produced a series of detailed plans that address the military dimension of the international response and its relationship to other actors; U.S. military planners played a key role in this planning. No such plan exists for the nonmilitary aspects, however, and—equally important—no plan integrates the military and nonmilitary components of the international response. The discontinuities between the political, economic, social, and military aspects of the international effort in Bosnia—for example, the fundamental tension between ethnic partition and integration—are partly the result of the absence of coherent, comprehensive planning to implement the Dayton accords. The absence of such planning within the United States was a prime factor in the unsatisfactory international situation.

An expert on the situation writes:

> The lack of coordination between military and civilian aspects of the peace
> process, the delay in funding and conditioning of funds to enforce specific
> Dayton provisions, and the related absence of an overall grand strategy for
> sustainable peace and a secure environment during the transition have lost
> the peace process valuable time and threaten to perpetuate a stalemate rather
> than end the Bosnian war.[45]

ADEQUATE RESOURCES

The generation of resources by the United States for the international effort
in Bosnia has been uneven. The United States leads the international mili-
tary effort and continues to exert political pressure on the Bosnian parties
to comply with Dayton. The United States committed more troops to IFOR
and its successor—the Stabilization Force (SFOR)—than any other nation.
The NATO command structure means that U.S. officers lead the interna-
tional forces both in NATO headquarters and on the ground in Bosnia. On
the political front, U.S. diplomats continue to shuttle through the Balkans,
pressing for implementation of the Dayton accords. But without clear lead-
ership in Washington and a comprehensive plan to guide the effort, these
resources may prove to have been squandered.

Further, adequate resources to support the other dimensions of the
response have not been generated. For example, the international police
task force run by the UN and aimed at filling the public security gap lacks
qualified manpower, transportation, and communications equipment.[46]
Only 30 percent of economic reconstruction funds pledged for 1996 were
available late in the year, including only 33 percent of the funds pledged
by the United States.[47]

Because there is no overall strategy to address the Bosnian crisis and
provide an operational context for the U.S. role in the Balkans, support for
continued U.S. involvement lags in Congress. Worse, attention shifted early
to a focus on the withdrawal of U.S. troops and the contribution of Euro-
pean allies relative to the U.S. effort.[48]

A MECHANISM TO MONITOR IMPLEMENTATION

Without strong leadership in Washington and an integrated strategic plan,
effective follow-up is not possible; U.S. policy will remain *ad hoc.* U.S.
policy for the last two years—to withdraw U.S. troops from the NATO mis-
sion on a particular date regardless of the conditions on the ground—

illustrates the lack of integration across the dimensions of the U.S. response. Not only did this stance disaggregate the military element from the overall strategy, but it also causes all the other relevant parties—those in Bosnia and in the international community—to wait and see what will happen when the date for U.S. withdrawal arrives. Such absolute milestones promote discontinuities within the overall policy and disharmony among the actors. There is little point in formulating or undertaking independent approaches when so much rests on the United States and NATO.

SUMMARY

The U.S. interagency response to Bosnia is closer to the incoherence of the Somalia policy than to the relative success in Haiti. Aspects of this regression include a lack of interagency leadership, the failure to develop a comprehensive strategic plan, uneven generation of resources, and—given these conditions—predictably poor follow-up. Recent policy adaptations in Washington—including more energetic leadership of the interagency and acceptance that U.S. troops will be required indefinitely—are positive steps, but it is too soon to predict their impact on the long-term effectiveness of U.S. policy.

CONCLUSIONS AND RECENT PROGRESS

The three cases considered above vary significantly in many aspects, including geostrategic importance, domestic U.S. political considerations, and level of U.S. commitment. Accepting the unique character of each case, the three cases taken together reveal a disturbing pattern of inconsistency in U.S. policymaking and highlight the importance of the four ingredients of successful policy coordination.

There are, however, some hopeful signs. In May 1997, the Clinton administration published Presidential Decision Directive 56 (PDD-56), "Managing Complex Contingency Operations."[49] This document aims to coordinate the civilian and military components of response efforts through integrated planning and effective management. It is an attempt to institutionalize lessons from recent experiences, including the three cases considered here. Most important, the PDD mandates the establishment of an EXCOMM for planning and implementation and provides adequate guidance on which to base a comprehensive political–military plan. Further, it calls

for interagency rehearsals, a formal review once an operation is complete, and an interagency training program. This is an impressive initiative that— if implemented fully—can have a significant effect on how the United States government operates in response to complex emergencies.

In the international arena, too, some progress has already been made to improve policy coordination at the strategic level. The UN designed its Department of Humanitarian Affairs, established in 1992, specifically to coordinate complex emergencies. Innovations such as the Inter-Agency Standing Committee, the Central Emergency Relief Fund, and the Consolidated Appeals Process are evidence that the challenges of policy coordination are recognized at the UN.[50] Within the UN's Department of Peacekeeping Operations, enhancement of the mission planning staff and establishment of a "lessons learned" office are steps in the right direction. UNHCR, too, has advanced its coordination processes, especially with other UN agencies and NGOs.[51] The World Conference on Religion and Peace has addressed coordination and strategic planning for complex emergencies.[52]

Despite such progress, however, based on the evidence of today's ongoing operation in Bosnia, the U.S. government still confronts unfolding crises in timeworn ways. Some small improvements have been made in the way the various agencies of U.S. foreign policy operate internally and relate to each other as the U.S. confronts, plans for, and responds to complex emergencies. It is too soon to assess the impact of PDD-56, but there has been little change in the integration of U.S. policy toward Bosnia in the months since its approval.

4

THREE STEPS TO BETTER POLICY

WHAT CAN BE DONE to reverse the pattern of Somalia–Haiti–Bosnia, build on the foundation of PDD-56, and reform U.S. policymaking to improve U.S. capacity to respond to complex emergencies?[53] This study suggests that three steps can lead to substantial improvement:

- Institutionalize the EXCOMM
- Prepare contingency plans
- Engage others early

INSTITUTIONALIZE THE EXCOMM

In PDD-56, the president mandates the establishment of an EXCOMM to handle each future complex emergency. This new policy should be implemented immediately for Bosnia. As discussed above, the Bosnia case

desperately requires increased coherence in U.S. policy; applying the new PDD is an appropriate first step. EXCOMM members should be assistant secretaries of the executive departments and agencies involved in the ongoing operation, but it should be possible to tailor membership as needed for specific issues. For example, if an operation involves training indigenous police, then ICITAP could be represented on the EXCOMM; or when considering transition to a UN operation, the EXCOMM might invite a representative of the UN's Department of Peacekeeping Operations to participate. The role of the EXCOMM should be to link the executive branch bureaucracies to the policy decision makers sitting on the Deputies and Principals Committees of the NSC.

Beyond PDD-56, the EXCOMM should be held accountable for meeting the four requirements of policy coordination throughout the entire life cycle of the response operation: it leads the interagency response effort, oversees the development of the comprehensive strategic plan, assembles adequate resources, and monitors implementation of the plan. To be effective the EXCOMM must have sufficient authority to move beyond narrow bureaucratic interests and to craft a comprehensive, coherent policy. In short, the EXCOMM must have teeth.

The experiences of Somalia and Bosnia demonstrate that there is no substitute for starting the policy process early. In the future, it is important to create the EXCOMM early before U.S. policy options are foreclosed by decisions of other contributors or before changes in the situation on the ground make the problem more difficult. An EXCOMM should be created as soon as the government recognizes that a complex emergency is likely to arise and the senior decision makers begin their assessment of potential U.S. involvement.

PREPARE CONTINGENCY PLANS

The U.S. government should move beyond PDD-56 and undertake as a matter of priority the preparation of contingency plans that outline the coordination requirements of U.S. policy options in potential complex emergencies.[54] These plans should be based on intelligence assessments of potential crises, produced by the executive departments with input from their experts in the regions, and should address the full range of coordination required in response operations. The key is to broaden contingency planning beyond the military. The process of producing these plans can be as important as the plan itself. The planning will promote interagency dialogue and the generation of policy options which avoid gaps, seams and myopia.

The contingency plan becomes the EXCOMM's starting point when an actual crisis arises. Armed with a preliminary plan on which to base its comprehensive strategy, the EXCOMM will be able to take the early lead in a response operation, when viable policy options are most numerous. The time saved early in the policy process pays dividends later as agencies contributing to the response operation gain time to prepare. This preparation time is especially important for civilian agencies that—unlike their military counterparts—do not maintain in-place capabilities for rapid crisis response.

ENGAGE OTHERS EARLY

Today's complex emergencies pose problems that are simply beyond the capacity of the United States alone. PDD-56 recognizes that U.S. involvement will likely be as part of a coalition. The United States must engage other potential international contributors—states, international organizations, NGOs—with the aim of including them in the U.S. contingency planning process. Planning for complex emergencies should be a regular item on the agenda for bilateral meetings with key U.S. allies. Further, the United States should use its leadership standing to promote contingency planning within the international organizations likely to play a role in future response operations.

The benefits of engaging other actors go beyond burden sharing. One objective of such planning should be to enhance the specialization of particular organizations; for example, one organization could specialize in reforming civilian police, while another develops a capability for water purification. Specifying roles can lead to improved preparation, shared expectations, and more efficient division of responsibility among all the key players when a crisis arises.

SUMMING UP

There is no end in sight to the pattern of complex emergencies that has developed in the 1990s. None of the cases discussed in this paper have come to a definitive end, yet others already loom on the horizon: North Korea, Albania/Kosovo, and Zaire are examples. While the U.S. role in future operations can vary widely—as it did across the three cases considered here—some U.S. role in response to future complex emergencies is likely. Improving the United States' capacity to respond begins with reforms at the policy level in Washington, where conducting "business as usual" has produced less than optimal results.

NOTES AND REFERENCES

1. For example, in 1975 the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) was called on to contend with 24 million refugees by expending $69 million; by 1995, 14.5 million refugees and an additional 12.9 million "other persons of concern" to UNHCR (for a total of 27.4 million persons) resulted in expenditures of $1,140 million. UNHCR, *The State of the World's Refugees 1995* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), pp. 19–20, 36, 247–248.

2. One exception is the emergence of the civil–military operations center (CMOC) to coordinate multilateral efforts in the field. See John Mackinlay, ed., *A Guide to Peace Support Operations* (Providence, RI: Thomas J. Watson, Jr., Institute for International Studies, Brown University, 1996), pp. 231–243; Field Manual No. 100-23, *Peace Operations* (Washington, D.C.: Department of the Army, 1994, pp. 16, 20–29; Joint Publication 3-08, *Interagency Coordination during Joint Operations*, Vol. I, (Washington, D.C.: Department of Defense, 1996), pp. III-16 to III-19.

3. UNHCR defines a complex emergency as "a humanitarian crisis in a country, region or society where there is a total or considerable breakdown of authority resulting from internal or external conflict, and which requires an international response that goes beyond the mandate or capacity of any single agency and/or the ongoing UN country programme." See also Andrew S. Natsios, *U.S. Foreign Policy and the Four Horsemen of the Apocalypse* (Westport, Conn: Praeger Publishers, 1997), pp. 6–7.

4. This paper does not address the question of whether or not the United States or the international community *should* be involved in responding to complex emergencies within states, with the attendant implications for sovereignty. The assumption here is that there will be external involvement.

5. Raimo Väyrynen, *The Age of Humanitarian Emergencies* (Helsinki: United Nations University/World Institute for Development Economics Research, 1996), p. 42; *Global Humanitarian Emergencies, 1996*, released by the United States Mission to the United Nations, 1996, p. 1; see also *A Guide to Peace Support Operations* (note 2, above), p. 14.

6. See, for example, Francis Mading Deng, "State Collapse: The Humanitarian Challenge to the United Nations," in *Collapsed States: The Disintegration and Restoration of Legitimate Authority*, I. William Zartman, ed. (Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1995), p. 215; Ted Robert Gurr, "Early-Warning Systems: From Surveillance to Assessment to Action," in *Preventive Diplomacy*, Kevin M. Cahill, ed. (New York: Basic Books, 1996), p. 130.

7. See Joint Publication 3-08, *Interagency Coordination During Joint Operations*, Vol. II, pp. D-2 to D-4 (note 2, above); *A Guide to Peace Support Operations* (note 2, above), p. 15.

8. See Robert Oakley and Michael Dziedzic, "Policing the New World Disorder," in *Strategic Forum* 84 (Washington, D.C.: Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University, October 1996), p. 4.

9. U.S. Army doctrine is spelled out in *Peace Operations* (note 2, above). See especially the definitions of types of operations, pp. 2–12, and the discussion of variables, pp. 12–13. See also three publications of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Joint Doctrine for Military Operations Other Than War*, Joint Pub 3-07 (Washington, D.C.: Department of Defense, 1995); *Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Peacekeeping Operations*, Joint Pub 3-07.3 (Washington, D.C.: Department of Defense, 1994); and *Joint Task Force Commander's Handbook for Peace Operations* (Washington, D.C.: Department of Defense, 1995). Also useful is *A Guide to Peace Support Operations* (note 2, above), pp. 160–173.

10. See, for example, Larry Diamond, *Promoting Democracy in the 1990s: Actors and Instruments, Issues and Imperatives* (Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict, 1995).

11. See, for example, International Research and Exchanges Board (IREX), "Civil Society in Bosnia–Herzegovina after Dayton: An Assessment," undated, pp. 2–13.

12. Andrew J. Goodpaster, *When Diplomacy is Not Enough: Managing Multinational Military Interventions* (Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict, July 1996), pp. 20–21.

13. Chris Seiple, *The U.S. Military/NGO Relationship in Humanitarian Interventions* (Carlisle Barracks, PA: Center for Strategic Leadership, U.S. Army War College), p. 6; *Interagency Coordination During Joint Operations*, vol. II, Appendix B (note 2, above); and *A Guide to Peace Support Operations* (note 2, above), p. 231.

14. The concept of gaps is not new. See Sadako Ogata, "Towards Healing the Wounds: Conflict-Torn States and the Return of Refugees," in *The United Nations: The Next Fifty Years*, Han Sung-Joo, ed. (Seoul: Ilmin International Relations Institute, Korea University, 1996), pp. 73–83.

15. See "Policing the New World Disorder" (note 8, above), pp. 1–4.

16. "Bosnia's Security and US Policy in the Next Phase," a policy paper of the Joint Policy Forum of the Atlantic Council of the United States, the East European Studies program of The Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, and the International Research and Exchanges Board (IREX), December 1996, p. 7.

17. In Recommendation 106 of the *Oslo Declaration and Plan of Action*, UNHCR and many NGOs called for smooth transitions from relief assistance to rehabilitation and development. Regarding transitions in Haiti, see Robert B. Oakley, "Developing a Strategy for Troubled States," in *Joint Forces Quarterly*, Summer 1996, p. 85; also, *Interagency and Political–Military Dimensions of Peace Operations: Haiti—A Case Study*, Margaret Daly Hayes and Gary F. Wheatley, eds. (Washington, D.C.: National Defense University, Washington, D.C., 1996); Carl Kaysen and George Rathjens, *Peace Operations by the United Nations: The Case for a Volunteer UN Military Force* (Cambridge, MA: American Academy of Arts and Sciences, Committee on International Security Studies, 1995), p. 39; Gabriel Marcella, *Haiti Strategy: Control, Legitimacy, Sovereignty,*

Rule of Law, Handoffs, and Exit (Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, October 1994).

18. Secretary of Defense William J Perry identified three categories of operations for the U.S. military in his March 1996 *Annual Report to the President and the Congress*: vital, important, and humanitarian. Vital operations occur when U.S. interests are at risk or an ally is threatened by conventional military force, economic strangulation, or weapons of mass destruction. Important operations, including military intervention in ethnic conflicts or civil wars, require the consideration of a number of critical factors, including: whether the intervention advances U.S. interests; whether the intervention is likely to accomplish U.S. objectives; whether the risks and costs are commensurate with the U.S. interests at stake; and whether all other means of achieving U.S. objectives have been exhausted. Humanitarian operations occur even in the absence of a direct threat to U.S. national interests, and military force may be appropriate in these operations when: a humanitarian crisis dwarfs the ability of civilian agencies to respond; the need for relief is urgent and only the military can respond quickly; the response requires resources unique to the military; and the risk to members of the U.S. service members is minimal. See also Suzanne M. Schafer, "Cohen Takes over at Pentagon, Cautions on Humanitarian Mission," Associated Press, January 24, 1997.

19. These steps may not lead to *successful* policy, rather, they should lead to *more effective* policy through improved coordination. Overall policy success depends on a wide variety of variables that are beyond the scope of this paper. Also, while the focus of this paper is on improving U.S. policy, the four requirements could be applied as well to international leaders of response efforts, such as the UN, NATO or other states.

20. The United States' initial reluctance to commit troops to Bosnia limited its influence mainly to international organizations such as the United Nations and NATO and the *ad hoc* Contact Group. See Elaine Sciolino, "Bosnia Policy Shaped by U.S. Military Role," *New York Times*, July 29, 1996, p. A15; Saadia Touval, "Lessons of Preventive Diplomacy in Yugoslavia," in *Managing Global Chaos: Sources of and Responses to International Conflict*, Chester A. Crocker and Fen Osler Hampson with Pamela Aall, eds. (Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace, 1996), pp. 408–410; David Owen, *Balkan Odyssey* (London: Victor Gollancz, 1995), p. 121.

21. According to Presidential Decision Directive 25, the Department of Defense will have lead responsibility for the oversight and management of peacekeeping operations which involve U.S. combat units while the Department of State will oversee and manage traditional peacekeeping operations in which U.S. combat units are not participating. The White House, Presidential Decision Directive 25, "The Clinton Administration's Policy on Reforming Multilateral Peace Operations" (Washington, D.C.: The White House, 1994).

22. Unrealistic goals will undermine the plan fundamentally as insufficient means create gaps. Further, unrealistic goals may initially generate domestic political support on idealistic grounds, only to produce a backlash of opposition when expectations are unfulfilled.

23. Further, contingency plans could then become the starting point for a comprehensive approach to coordinating future operations. A sequence employed typically at operational and tactical levels—plan, train, execute, and learn—should be adopted at the policy level. This model takes into account the importance to coordination of adequate preparation (plan and train) as well as the value of translating lessons from one operation to the next. See *Interagency Coordination during Joint Operations* (note 2, above) pp. I-12 to I-14.

24. Although no list currently ranks comparative advantage of NGOs depending on area or situation, a number of organizations, including ACCESS at the Fund for Peace, InterAction, and the UN's Department of Humanitarian Affairs, monitor some NGO capabilities and strengths.

25. Within the US. government, the most flexible source of funding for complex emergencies is Department of Defense operations and maintainance accounts and "drawdown" authorities. This partially explains the tendency for the United States to focus on military aspects of these operations.

26. The best single source for the various operations in Somalia from the UN's perspective is *The United Nations and Somalia, 1992–1996* (New York: United Nations Department of Public Information, 1996). A view from the United States is provided in John L. Hirsch and Robert B.

Oakley, *Somalia and Operation Restore Hope* (Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1995).

27. Jonathan Moore, *The UN and Complex Emergencies* (Geneva: UN Research Institute for Social Development, 1996), p. 12.

28. The term "interagency" is used in Washington to describe the group of bureaucratic actors relevant to a particular policy issue.

29. Don Oberdorfer, "The Path to Intervention," *Washington Post*, December 6, 1992, p. A1.

30. *Somalia and Operation Restore Hope* (note 26, above), p. 42.

31. Ibid., p. 133.

32. Walter S. Clarke, "Testing the World's Resolve in Somalia," *Parameters* 23(4) (Winter 1993–94), p. 44.

33. *The United Nations and Somalia, 1992–1996* (note 26, above), p. 85.

34. For a good summary of the Haiti case, see United Nations, Department of Public Information, *The Blue Helmets: A Review of United Nations Peace-keeping Forces*, 3rd edition (New York: United Nations, 1996). For insights to U.S. policymaking, see Margaret Daly Hayes and Gary F. Wheatley, *Interagency and Political–Military Dimensions of Peace Operations: Haiti—A Case Study* (Washington, D.C.: National Defense University, 1996).

35. *Interagency and Political-Military Dimensions of Peace Operations* (note 34, above), p. 33.

36. Ibid., pp. 34, 51.

37. Ibid., pp. 29–48.

38. U.S. Army Peacekeeping Institute, *Success in Peacekeeping, United Nations Mission in Haiti: The Military Perspective* (Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army Peacekeeping Institute), pp. 3–4.

39. UNMIH was replaced in June 1996 by the UN Support Mission in Haiti (UNSMIH). In July 1997, the UN Transition Mission in Haiti (UNTMIH) took over, and in November 1997, UNTMIH gave way to the UN Civilian Police Mission in Haiti (known by its French acronym MIPONUH).

40. See, for example, Robert Oakley and Michael Dziedzic, "Sustaining Success in Haiti," in *Strategic Forum*, no. 77 (Washington, D.C.: Institute for National Security Studies, June 1996); John Sweeney, "Stuck in Haiti," *Foreign Policy*, no. 102 (Spring 1996), pp. 143–151; Donald E. Schultz, *Haiti Update* (Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College), January 29, 1997; Douglas Farah, "Haitians to Vote, but Poverty, the Top Issue, Is Not on Ballot," in the *Washington Post*, April 6, 1997, p. A23. In general, inadequate resources were committed to reforming the justice system. Economic assistance has been slowed by coordination difficulties (both among U.S. actors and between the United States and others) and by failure of the Haitian government to meet pre-conditions for privitization.

41. For an overview of the Bosnia case see *The Blue Helmets* (note 34, above). For assessment of the situation since the Dayton Peace Agreement, see Susan L. Woodward, *America's Bosnia Policy: The Work Ahead*, Brookings Policy Brief No. 2 (Washington D.C.: The Brookings Institution, July 1996); and Susan L. Woodward, *Implementing Peace In Bosnia and Herzegovina: A Post-Dayton Primer and Memorandum of Warning*, Brookings Discussion Paper, (Washington D.C.: The Brookings Institution, May 1996). Assessment of interagency actions is based on the author's numerous interviews with National Security Council, Department of Defense, and Department of State officials, November 1995 through April 1997.

42. Georgie Anne Geyer, "Lacking Strategy to Exit Bosnia," *The Washington Times*, April 4, 1997, p. 14.

43. *Implementing Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina* (note 40, above), pp. ii, 26, 40.

44. The individual annexes of the Dayton accord set out tasks and assign responsibilities across the various dimensions of the agreement, but these pieces are not integrated into a coherent whole. In particular, the military and civilian tasks are deliberately set apart. Only the military annex provides sufficient detail to form the basis for effective operational planning and implementation.

45. *Implementing Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina* (note 40, above), p. i.

46. "Policing the New World Disorder" (note 8, above), p. 3.

47. John Pomfret, "Gorazde's Water Woes Typify Obstacles Facing Nation," *Washington Post*, October 13, 1996, p. A1, A44. As in Somalia and Haiti, economic assistance funding is slow and is constrained by conditionality and bureaucracy.

48. For example, see Van Hilleary, "A New Bosnia Policy," *Washington Times*, May 13, 1997, p. A19.

49. See White Paper, "The Clinton Administration's Policy on Managing Complex Contingency Operations: Presidential Decision Directive 56," May 1997. Within the U.S. government there are examples of related progress. Much more detailed than PDD-56, the Federal Emergency Management Agency's (FEMA) Federal Response Plan for disasters specifies authorities, relationships, and responsibilities among actors contributing to a response within the United States. Mandated by federal legislation and coordinated across 28 federal and state agencies, this plan establishes the framework to meet the four policy coordination requirements discussed in this paper and offers an example of the sort of work required for coordinating international crises.

Also, changes in U.S. military doctrine reflect the military's acknowledgment of the need to adapt to the challenges posed by complex emergencies. This doctrinal work focuses on levels below national policy—the operational (or theater) level and the tactical (or field) level. An important exception to this lower-level focus is Joint Publication 3-08, *Interagency Coordination during Joint Operations*, which addresses the challenges of national policy coordination from the perspective of the military as one of the participants. While it is more descriptive than prescriptive, this manual reflects the appreciation within the military of the complexity of such operations and the need for enhanced coordination.

50. See UN Department of Humanitarian Affairs, *The MCDA Reference Manual* (New York: United Nations, 1995), Chapter 2.3. In December 1996, the General Assembly called upon the Secretary-General to ensure that the Inter-Agency Standing Committee "develop options and proposals to further define operational responsibilities between its members, drawing on their respective mandates, expertise, respective strengths and available capabilities, to identify cooperative arrangements to strengthen their joint capacities and to strengthen its work in priority setting and formulation of coherent humanitarian strategies." UN Press Release GA/9207, December 17, 1996.

51. See, for example, Oslo Declaration and Plan of Action, June 1994. Also, High Commissioner Sadako Ogata's concept of "predictable complementarity" defines well the interrelationship required for effective coordination; see Sadako Ogata, "Towards Healing the Wounds: Conflict-Torn States and the Return of Refugees," in *The United Nations: The Next Fifty Years*, Han Sung-Joo, ed. (Seoul: Ilmin International Relations Institute, Korea University, 1996), p. 87.

52. *Interagency Coordination During Joint Operations*, Vol. II, *Appendix J* (note 2, above).

53. Other works approach this general topic from different perspectives For suggested reforms within the U.S. government, for example, see Paul David Miller, *The Interagency Process* (Cambridge, Massachusetts: The Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis, 1993). For an application of modern business approaches to U.S. policymaking, see Antonia Handler Chayes, Abram Chayes, and George Roach, *Beyond Reform: Restructuring for More Effective Intervention*. Conflict Management Group Working Paper Series (Cambridge, Mass.: Conflict Management Group, November, 1996). Jonathan Moore addresses reforms within the UN in *The UN and Complex Emergencies* (note 27, above).

54. In the U.S. military, contingency planning is conducted routinely by the regional commanders-in-chief and is reviewed by the Joint Staff. This process presents a model for development of the civilian–military plans recommended here.

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